Tehran - BORNA - Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former Foreign Minister and founder of the Payab Think Tank, along with Amirparsa Garmsiri, a Ph.D. student in International Relations, published an article highlighting Iran's cultural and historical capacities and its geopolitical position as a "natural mediator." They proposed that by breaking the securitization cycle formed by the U.S. and the Zionist regime, Iran can facilitate dialogue between Asia and Europe, become a center for regional trade, and bring peace, development, and stability for the future.
In the article published in Foreign Affairs, it is stated: "Security in contemporary international relations is not just a goal that countries pursue for themselves; it is also a concept used to justify controlling, limiting, and directing the behavior of others. When political scientists speak of 'securitization,' they refer to a process in which a specific issue is portrayed as an existential threat—a threat that, instead of being handled through normal political mechanisms, is presented as requiring extraordinary and exceptional measures."
The Islamic Republic of Iran is a very clear example of this situation. Over the past two decades, Israel and the United States have tried to convince the world that Iran should not be considered a normal country, but rather the main danger to the international order. The result of these efforts has been constant condemnations, crushing sanctions, threats of military action, and in recent months, direct military operations against Iranian territory, even during diplomatic negotiations between Tehran and Washington. In response, Iran has inevitably been forced to spend more resources and attention on defense. Additionally, to demonstrate that it will not surrender to pressure, it has increased its uranium enrichment levels. Consequently, the external securitization of Iran has created a similar dynamic domestically, leading to a stricter approach and increased restrictions in the face of social challenges.
The authors stated: "The result of this process is the formation of a securitization cycle—a hostile cycle in which Iran and its enemies feel forced to adopt more aggressive policies." This phenomenon is similar to the "security dilemma" where increasing one side's material capabilities causes a counter-reaction. However, in the securitization cycle, the starting point is not material power but rather the discursive and public persuasion sphere. The target country is first portrayed as a threat, then treated accordingly, and the country responds with actions—such as strengthening missile power or increasing enrichment—which are then used to "verify" the original claims. This cycle, in practice, creates a "self-fulfilling prophecy." The securitized country gradually loses its independent agency and becomes trapped in a series of reactive behaviors.
The article suggests: "Breaking this cycle will not be easy and requires foreign powers to recognize Iran's rights and dignity and to stop groundless accusations, threats, and constant pressure on a several-thousand-year-old 'civilization-state.' But Tehran can also take steps to break this vicious cycle. The government can increase public support through economic reforms, which also strengthens its negotiating power. After all, the Iranian people have been the country's greatest asset in deterrence and resistance against foreign aggression. Tehran can moderate its emphasis on material defensive power, which often reinforces threat perceptions, and instead emphasize cooperation and coordination, especially at the regional level. It can also enter into frank dialogues with the IAEA to resolve mutual concerns and resume cooperation. Furthermore, to manage differences with the United States, it can first engage on the nuclear file and sanctions."
Securitization forced Iran into reactive policies and resistance
In another part of the article, addressing the "Maximum Pressure" policy of the Donald Trump administration based on baseless claims against Iran's nuclear program and regional role, it is stated: "Iran has been the target of intense securitization by Israel and the U.S. for the past twenty years. The two have built and promoted a narrative portraying Iran as an existential threat not only to the region but to the entire world. Benjamin Netanyahu, who called the Iranian government an 'apocalyptic cult,' claimed in a 1992 Knesset speech that 'Iran is three to five years away from the capability to produce nuclear weapons.' Donald Trump also called Iran a 'very evil place' alongside other insults. The absurdity of these claims has not stopped them from continuing this narrative and adopting more hostile behavior. The U.S. has imposed exceptional economic sanctions on Iran. Israel, with Washington's support, has targeted Iran's infrastructure and killed military commanders, scientists, and even ordinary citizens."
As a result, instead of pursuing its own targeted plans, Iran has been forced to adopt reactive and resistance policies. In response to increased U.S. and Israeli pressure, it raised enrichment to 60% and reduced cooperation with the IAEA. Following the unjustified joint attacks by the U.S. and the Zionist regime, discussions emerged among ordinary Iranians about the necessity of changing the country's defense doctrine toward nuclear weapons. Requests to close the Strait of Hormuz increased. If there were no aggression and pressure, Iran would have continued unprecedented cooperation with the Agency under the 2015 agreement and focused on regional cooperation, which it has pioneered since 1985.
Zarif and Garmsiri argued: "The securitization against Iran has formed a 'siege mentality'—a mindset that often leads to harder social controls, including restrictions on the internet and social media and surveillance measures to identify spies and saboteurs. These measures cannot resolve the roots of internal dissatisfaction—economic problems, erosion of social capital, and the widening gap between state and society. However, such measures are the result of the long-term imposition of a 'siege mentality.' In Tehran's case, this securitization first began with Saddam Hussein, who waged an eight-year war against Iran, and continued with separatist violence and extensive terrorist attacks after the Revolution. It also persisted through constant threats and coercion from the U.S. and Israel. Any government in such a situation would become overwhelmed by real and perceived threats to its dignity and independence."
Furthermore, foreign threats are a major reason for Iran's difficulties. Tehran has been forced to allocate more to defense and reduce development and welfare because Iraq, Israel, and the U.S. have attacked it. The U.S. economic war, from Barack Obama's "crippling sanctions" to Trump's "maximum pressure" campaign, has led to the crash of the Rial, unbearable inflation, and corruption resulting from bypassing sanctions. But instead of accepting their role in the misery of the Iranian people, foreign powers have presented a selective, exaggerated, and politicized image of the Islamic Republic as a human rights violator. This has intensified the securitization cycle and reduced Iran’s capacity for independent agency on the global stage.
Exit via precise diplomacy
As a proposal for "building a better Iran and a safer world," it is suggested: "Tehran and its opponents must find an exit from this vicious cycle. It is clear that some paths do not work. Pressure has failed to force Iran to change its behavior. On the other hand, Iran's defensive actions, including increasing enrichment, have never reduced perceived threats. Securitization operates in the realm of mental perception, not material capacity. Consequently, the target's defensive actions usually reinforce the securitizing forces' narrative. This is especially true regarding provocative rhetoric, such as the irresponsible statements of some Iranian politicians in the 2010s (90s SH) claiming Iran controls 'four Arab capitals' (Damascus, Baghdad, Beirut, and Sana’a)—statements that gave securitizing forces a free hand to escalate pressure."
It may seem that Tehran is caught in an inescapable trap. But experience shows that an exit can be found through precise diplomacy. Iran managed to break the securitization cycle in the first half of the 2010s through dialogue with the U.S., leading to the 2015 JCPOA—an agreement ensuring Iran would never seek nuclear weapons in exchange for economic normalization. This agreement changed Iran's international environment, at least temporarily. UN Security Council Resolution 2231 stated that "the conclusion of the JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in the consideration of this issue" and expressed a desire to "build a new relationship with Iran based on the implementation of the JCPOA."
The authors believe: "Iran's success in reaching the agreement was, first and foremost, the product of massive public participation in the 2013 presidential election—participation that destroyed the illusion in the U.S. and Europe of the imminent collapse of the Islamic Republic—an illusion formed from the events following the 2009 election. The election also gave the new Rouhani government domestic legitimacy to protect the rights of the Iranian people not through confrontation but through dialogue."
Along these lines: "Breaking the securitization cycle began from within and with internal consensus-building. Iran can create such a consensus once again, but this requires a national dialogue among political groups, social movements, and the people. Fortunately, Iran has virtual platforms created by non-governmental organizations where citizens can record their grievances about policies and officials. The government should encourage this reporting and require agencies to take corrective actions. Such an act would increase social capital and provide the necessary platform for anti-securitization policies. The government can increase public trust by improving living conditions. Although the U.S. economic war has limited large-scale economic progress in the short term, the government can still fight corruption, increase transparency, and curb rents resulting from bypassing sanctions. These actions would reduce social and economic inequality, increase public satisfaction, and lessen the need for domestic security policies."
Transitioning from 'Strong Iran' to 'Strong Region'
Addressing internal capacities and Iran's geostrategy, the article states: "While building internal consensus, Tehran can work to improve its international image. Officials should prioritize confidence-building measures focused on dialogue with neighbors. They can pursue the HOPE (Hormuz Peace Endeavor) initiative proposed by Hassan Rouhani, which focused on cooperation among countries in the strategic Strait of Hormuz. They can emphasize the MAVADAT proposal (Muslim West Asian Dialogue Forum) so that the eight Persian Gulf littoral states, along with Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey, move from hostility toward dialogue. They can also pursue the MENARE proposal (Middle East Network for Aerospace Research and Excellence) to advance regional non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament mechanisms while supporting cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology among regional countries that reject nuclear weapons."
The article proposes: "Iran has the highest aggregate power and human, natural, and geostrategy resources in the region, and it is logical for it to take a pioneering role in these initiatives. Tehran must also understand that its power can cause concern for others; therefore, it is necessary to transition from the 'Strong Iran' narrative, which can be seen as unilateral and threatening, to a 'Strong Region' narrative. Iranian officials can present the country's scientific and cultural power not as a sign of Iranian hegemony but as a source for the joint development of West Asia. Of course, regional countries must also play their part. They should isolate the figure most responsible for Iran's securitization, namely Netanyahu—someone who sees war, insecurity, and crisis as necessary for his political survival. This attitude is the exact opposite of Iran's policy, which, based on the second principle of its Constitution, is built on the 'negation of any oppression, subjection to oppression, dominance, or submission to dominance' and 'using advanced human sciences, arts, and experiences and efforts in advancing them' to ensure 'equity, justice, political, economic, social, and cultural independence, and national solidarity.'
Israel's recent behavior has created a new opportunity for Iran. The horrific crimes in Gaza have caused global hatred and crossed ideological boundaries of conscience. Few governments have as consistently defended Palestinians and condemned Israel's behavior as Iran. Tehran can work with international organizations, including the UN and the ICJ, to create global empathy and consensus against apartheid, genocide, and aggression. Such an action could neutralize or even reverse Iran's securitization. How can Iran be securitized with nuclear proliferation charges while the main claimant of this accusation is a regime possessing an illegal nuclear arsenal?"
How is managing differences with the U.S. possible?
Addressing the nuclear program as the first challenge that could unlock other resolvable differences, the article states: "For Iran, the region is always the priority, but Tehran must also deepen its relations in other areas. This includes close cooperation with Russia. Coordination with China—a rising great power—is an inescapable necessity. But Tehran will also benefit from improving relations with Europe and managing differences with the U.S. This will help Iran be a serious, equal, and long-term partner for Russia and China, rather than turning to them merely out of necessity.
Managing differences with the U.S. may be necessary to break the securitization cycle. No government, except the Israeli regime, has worked as hard as Washington to isolate Iran. Therefore, it is appropriate for Tehran to examine the possibility of direct dialogue from a position of equality with Washington. Of course, expectations must be managed; the goal of such negotiations cannot be a return to friendly relations. Fundamental identity and ideological differences exist; for Washington, the nature of Iran's revolutionary political structure and its stance toward Israel; for Tehran, the blind U.S. support for Israel and the U.S. global presence. But by 'agreeing to disagree' in these ideological areas, they can be prevented from turning into crises. The parties can also resolve many political differences through trade-offs.
Iran's nuclear program and U.S. sanctions are at the top of these issues—the very knot the JCPOA was designed to untie. The U.S. must accept that it cannot destroy Iran's indigenous capacities; these capacities are rebuildable. But the parties can agree on two common goals: Iran must never produce nuclear weapons, and the U.S. must never take military or economic war actions against Iran. Within this framework, Iran can offer transparency, enrichment limits, and even a regional mechanism like an enrichment consortium, and the U.S. can lift its sanctions and UN sanctions.
Iran can facilitate the grounds for an agreement through proper cooperation with the IAEA. Iran's concern is that information provided to the Agency might be used for military targeting. The Director General's statements in June that 'Tehran has not answered the Agency's questions or provided credible technical answers' were also quickly exploited by Israel to justify attacks. Iran has the right to require the Agency to strictly adhere to procedures and standards of conduct in impartiality, fairness, confidentiality, and sensitivity to national security. But if these concerns are managed, the benefit of cooperation should outweigh its cost. Transparency with the Agency should prevent the publication of securitizing narratives and pave the way for a political agreement with the U.S."
Zarif and Garmsiri, with the view that "if Tehran and Washington can implement an updated version of the JCPOA, they might be able to manage other difficult issues like regional security, arms control, and fighting terrorism," wrote: "For example, Iran might agree not to attack the U.S. or its allies and, in return, receive a similar commitment. Iran might agree to use its military power only in legitimate defense against a military attack, with the other side giving a similar commitment. But the U.S. must resolve Iran's security concerns, including its threatening presence around Iran and the unprecedented flood of advanced U.S. weapons into the region. Despite U.S. claims about Iran's defensive capabilities, in real terms, per capita, and as a share of GDP, Tehran spends a fraction of the military expenditure of U.S. allies in the region.
Tehran and Washington may also find that they can practically help each other in some areas. Iran has an extensive network of universities, an educated population, and a dynamic private sector with historical ties to global markets. Iran is one of the world's most stable and profitable untapped economies. Therefore, the two countries can cooperate on scientific and technological issues.
Areas for short-term foreign policy coordination may also emerge. Despite strategic differences, Tehran and Washington have cooperated in Afghanistan, Iraq, and against ISIS in recent decades. Today, they also face common challenges in extremism and threats to freedom of navigation, which could be an arena for conflict prevention or even limited cooperation. Fighting international drug trafficking is also an area for cooperation. Iran, located on the Afghan drug transit route, has paid a heavy human and financial cost, losing thousands of its law enforcement personnel. Quiet coordination, from information sharing to technical support, can reduce a common security threat without the need for political alignment on ideological issues."
Iran is a natural mediator
In the final part, emphasizing that breaking the securitization cycle is "also vital for the U.S. and Europe," it is stated: "The securitization cycle has placed Iran, the region, and NATO countries, especially the U.S., in a complex and self-reinforcing situation. Iran's defensive and reactive actions have not only not reduced the threat but have intensified security perceptions about Iran and solidified the narrative of Tehran being dangerous. Breaking this cycle is a vital necessity for Tehran. The idea that Iran is an existential threat is entirely incorrect; but this perception has created an existential threat for Iranians, as the June attacks clearly showed.
Escaping securitization requires a set of simultaneous, comprehensive, and coordinated strategies—active regional and global diplomacy, internal reforms, domestic and foreign confidence-building measures, returning to the motivational power of the Islamic Revolution, non-provocative strengthening of defensive power, and changing the method of strategic propaganda.
Meanwhile, breaking the securitization cycle is also vital for the U.S. and Europe. They must engage with Iran not as a threat but as a potential partner. This is in their own interest. By getting trapped in a war and security discourse against Iran, Washington and Europe have increased regional and global tensions without achieving any of their stated goals. Their interest lies in respecting Iran's independence, dignity, and legitimate rights and focusing on the main cause of regional instability, namely Israel's illegal and inhumane behavior.
Iran is a natural mediator. Its culture, history, and location are such that it can facilitate dialogue between Asia and Europe. Iran can be a trade hub, especially for landlocked Central Asian countries. Its human capital caIran is a natural mediator. Its culture, history, and location are such that it can facilitate dialogue between Asia and Europe. Iran can be a trade hub, especially for landlocked Central Asian countries. Its human capital can make Iran a great partner for global innovation. Breaking the securitization cycle and returning Iran to its rightful place can bring peace, development, and stability for the coming decades.
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