Tehran and Europe: Between Engagement and Confrontation
Jalal Khosh-Chehre, the editorial chief of Borna News Agency wrote: The record of Tehran–Europe relations over the past four decades has followed a cyclical path, oscillating between confrontation and engagement. These relations have consistently been shaped by three main variables: first, the principles of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy and its revolutionary outlook toward the international order; second, the quality and extent of Tehran’s relations with Washington; and third, Europe’s alignment with Washington—and, at critical junctures, with Tel Aviv—despite Tehran’s expectation that Europe might at times pursue an independent course of action.
Longstanding points of contention
Traditionally, disputes between Tehran and Europe have revolved around several recurring issues: Iran’s nuclear program and JCPOA commitments, missile capabilities, Tehran’s eastward foreign policy orientation, Europe’s ties with Iran’s regional rivals, terrorism, maritime security in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, and human rights. These disagreements have persisted over time within a framework of “confrontation and engagement,” never reaching a definitive resolution, yet relations themselves have remained in place.
What distinguishes the present moment is that Europe has shifted toward a new approach: replacing the older pattern of “engagement–confrontation” with a framework of “pressure–confrontation.” Notably, Europe once attempted to play the role of “good cop” in contrast to Washington’s harder line, presenting itself as a parallel actor offering dialogue. Today, however, Europe insists on the same “pressure-for-compliance” strategy that Washington has employed to push Tehran toward its demands. As a result, where once differences across the Atlantic were discernible, both sides now project a single, unified voice to Tehran.
The Istanbul talks
The upcoming meeting between Iranian deputy foreign ministers and the European troika in Istanbul (Tuesday, August 26, 2025) must be viewed in this context. The framework mirrors that of previous Istanbul talks, but with a key difference: unlike in the past—when negotiations combined threats and intimidation with dialogue—Europe today emphasizes primarily the threat of “snapback” sanctions and potential referral of Iran’s nuclear file to the UN Security Council.
The substance of this approach, which Tehran has clearly recognized, reflects Europe’s effort—aligned with Washington—to pressure Iran into hasty decision-making. From Tehran’s perspective, such tactics will not bring the parties closer to a “point of balance” that could yield constructive compromise. Rather, they reinforce the perception that Europe, alongside Washington and Tel Aviv, is intent on portraying Tehran as rigid and uncompromising. Yet Iran expects Europe, especially in light of its recent experience with the Ukraine war negotiations and the role of Donald Trump’s U.S. administration, to pursue a more independent path guided by its own security and economic interests.
The cost–benefit test
If Europe is genuinely seeking an agreement with Tehran, the only viable path is a “benefit-driven” approach to negotiations. This requires two key elements: cost–benefit calculation and political judgment by both parties. By weighing advantages and disadvantages, and bargaining accordingly, the sides could reach a point of balance. Conversely, reliance on “power-centric” logic and hard-power threats leads only to a contest in which all parties lose.
Europe’s alignment with Washington in its three-pronged strategy against Tehran—maximum pressure, threat of snapback, and military intimidation—will only escalate the crisis and render dialogues such as the Istanbul meeting fruitless. It is unrealistic to expect Tehran to adopt a softer stance without meaningful concessions on the table.
The unfinished match
As commentators in football often say: “The game is not over yet. The second half is shaped by the players’ stamina and the coaches’ strategy.” Tehran and Europe are now in that second half, in extra time, where decisions will prove decisive.
Despite the long history of alternating confrontation and engagement, and despite skepticism surrounding the Istanbul meeting, diplomacy must not be discounted. The unique function of diplomacy is to make the “impossible” possible—unless, of course, the parties have already set their sights on an entirely different agenda.
End of Editorial