Robert Malley: Iran Lacks Incentive for Meaningful Compromise Without U.S. Guarantees
Tehran - BORNA - Robert Malley, the senior negotiator for the administrations of “Barack Obama” and “Joe Biden” on the Iranian nuclear issue, wrote in a post on his official page on the X social network (formerly Twitter) in response to an analysis by “Danny Citrinowicz,” a prominent West Asia analyst, regarding the fresh talks between Iran and the U.S. on the nuclear program and the lifting of sanctions amidst intensifying military tensions: “If Iranian leaders believe that escalation is inevitable regardless of their concessions, they will have little incentive for real compromise.”
He added: “In the past, they had no guarantee that the agreement they reached would not be rescinded. Now, they have no guarantee that the regime will not be attacked.”
Malley’s remarks come on the eve of a new round of Tehran-Washington negotiations regarding the nuclear program and the lifting of sanctions, which, according to media reports, will be held on Tuesday, February 17, in Geneva.
In this regard, the spokesperson for the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced last night his country’s readiness to “facilitate talks” between Iran and the U.S. with the mediation of Oman. Iran and the U.S. also held another round of talks in Muscat on February 6, the results of which were described as “good.”
Washington has stated that Iran’s missile program, its domestic issues, and Iran’s role in the region must also be resolved in any negotiations with Iran. However, Iran has emphasized that its defensive capability is non-negotiable and that it is ready to talk only about its nuclear program from a position of equality.
U.S. President “Donald Trump,” who has deployed a carrier strike group and additional military equipment to West Asia, has stated that his plan is to negotiate with Iran, but in line with his dual approach known as “Peace through Strength,” he has declared the opportunity for diplomacy to be limited and has threatened military action.
Tehran officials, stating they are prepared for any scenario, have warned that a decisive defense against any aggression will be regional and widespread.
The Main Divide in Tehran-Washington Negotiations
In the same vein, Citrinowicz—a member of the European Council on Foreign Relations—who also has a long history of activity in the intelligence-security apparatus, analyzed on his X page: The U.S. and Iran are facing a deeper gap in technical issues on the eve of nuclear negotiations in Geneva, but a fundamental difference between them is the conceptual understanding of both sides regarding leverage, risk-taking, and the goal of the negotiations. The U.S., by increasing military pressure in the region, seeks to force Iran into nuclear concessions in exchange for lifting the military threat. This is while there is no guarantee from Washington for the lifting of sanctions. Tehran, in contrast, deems concessions possible not merely in exchange for lifting a military threat, but only if it results in tangible economic benefits.
This security and regional analyst suggested that both sides follow different scenarios, confident in their ability to manage the consequences of escalating tensions, but ultimately, their confidence in their own definition of leverage and a coercive approach makes resolving the issues more difficult.
According to this expert’s claim, Tehran has assessed that by enduring initial blows and imposing costs through regional tools, it can drive Washington toward de-escalation, while Washington believes that military superiority combined with the impact of Washington’s sanctions on Iran’s economy will eventually force Tehran to surrender.
Citrinowicz also suggested in this analysis: Statements by U.S. officials about regime change have increased mistrust in Tehran and strengthened the view that Washington’s ultimate goal goes beyond a nuclear agreement.
He believes that the most dangerous variable in these negotiations is not the technical disagreement over nuclear issues, but rather the vast conceptual gap between the two sides in their understanding of leverage, deterrence, and goals and intentions.
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