How Long Will Iran's Policy of Suspending Cooperation with the IAEA Last?
Tehran - BORNA - Rafael Grossi, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), recently claimed in an interview with the British newspaper Financial Times: "You [Iran] cannot say I am staying in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and then not fulfill your commitments, and expect me to say, 'Alright, because a war happened, we’ll put you in a different category of NPT members.'"
Grossi stated that if Iran does not return to cooperation under the Safeguards, he would be forced to report that all his surveillance over the materials has been lost.
In another part of the interview, the IAEA chief spoke in a threatening tone, saying: "Referring Iran's file to the UN Security Council due to reduced inspections is not yet necessary, but cooperation must seriously improve."
Contrary to the analysis of some officials who emphasize that Grossi has been contradictory in recent months, especially after the aggressive attack against Iran, his statements and positions are not contradictory; rather, he is consistently moving towards building a case against Iran. At this stage, Grossi is attempting, by any means—whether through a short-term understanding with Iran or through legal and safeguards pressure, particularly via his interviews and speeches—to push Iran toward his partisan demands.
It is clear that this effort is not aimed at implementing the NPT and safeguards in Iran but serves the interests of a few countries in the IAEA that seek information about the targeted sites. If the Director-General intended to act in line with the NPT, he should have at least condemned the blatant aggression by Israel and the US against Iran's active and supervised facilities. Instead, he acted contrary to the rules and spirit governing the NPT, the UN Charter, and numerous resolutions, including UN Security Council Resolution 487 (1981), which prohibits the threat or attack against nuclear facilities and centers.
For the first time in global nuclear history, a military attack has been launched against an NPT member state since the IAEA's founding. Despite explicit resolutions condemning nuclear threats and military attacks on facilities, the Agency maintained complete silence. It is clear that Iran today is an "exception" in global nuclear history; a country with an unprecedented record of accepting inspections and cooperating with the Agency at safeguards and non-safeguards levels, while simultaneously facing political pressure, military threat, and aggression. Meanwhile, neither the UN nor the international nuclear watchdog offers any support against the blatant military aggression of Israel and the US against Iran. Yet, five months after the attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, the Director-General takes a one-sided and biased position in favor of the aggressors.
Temporary Suspension of Cooperation; Iran's Legitimate Right in a State of War
In this report, we attempt a legal, political, and security-intelligence review of whether, contrary to the Director-General's view, a country whose nuclear facilities have been militarily attacked can temporarily suspend or fail to implement some of its commitments under these conditions.
From a legal perspective, according to the NPT and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), Iran must allow inspectors access to declared nuclear materials and facilities... however, this commitment is not absolute. That is, the host country can temporarily limit access in an emergency due to issues like nuclear safety, security, or military concerns (within the framework of its national sovereignty)... provided that the reason for imposing the security limitation is documented, which in Iran's case, it is unlikely any authority would deem the military attack on nuclear facilities to be undocumented or unreal.
Based on safeguards commitments, Iran must officially notify the Agency of the latest status of its nuclear sites and centers, which the Atomic Energy Organization regularly informed the IAEA about the status of sites, nuclear materials, etc., during and after the 12-day war.
Furthermore, Iran must provide alternative or delayed access for inspectors after the military and nuclear threats are removed. Naturally, the timing and manner of the inspectors' return and inspection of the sites are at Iran's discretion and based on Iran's security and political considerations. The NPT and the CSA contain no single article addressing the level and type of cooperation in the event of an attack on an active nuclear facility of a member state. Therefore, the Agency cannot pressure Iran for limiting cooperation or delaying its implementation, nor can it expect Iran to behave normally during and after wartime conditions.
But what are the reasons for Iran limiting authorization for inspections of the targeted nuclear sites?
Increased leakage of information and espionage by IAEA inspectors, which in some cases led to the expulsion of several inspectors in the past year, is a key reason Iran is not allowing inspectors to enter the sites under current security conditions.
From a political and security perspective, the tense relations between Iran and the IAEA before the war became severely strained after the military attacks, and deep mistrust between the two sides has heightened, particularly due to the Agency's and the Director-General's positions and passivity. Iran holds the Agency responsible for giving Israel the "green light" to attack its nuclear facilities, as the nuclear watchdog's silence in the face of the blatant violation of UNSC Resolution 487 has effectively paved the way for aggression. In a situation where Iran is militarily attacked by an official (US) and a semi-official (Israel) member of the Agency, and the Agency remains completely silent, relying on the Agency to provide information and access is impossible.
Iran believes that returning to a path of full cooperation requires a confidence-building and compensatory step from the IAEA. The Director-General, as the international nuclear watchdog, must at least issue a firm public statement, without prejudice and without naming the aggressors, to strongly condemn the danger of military attacks on an NPT member state's safeguarded nuclear facilities and emphasize the need for the full implementation of UNSC Resolution 487. Such an action could provide the necessary political environment to reduce skepticism and pave the way for Iran's controlled and limited return to verification cooperation in the short term.
Necessity of Suspending Cooperation with a Roadmap
Mohammad Eslami, Head of the Atomic Energy Organization, previously called the Agency's report political, stating: "The IAEA Director-General, due to his interest in remaining in office, acts in compliance with pressure, and hence, the prevailing approach in the Agency's reports has become more political... Furthermore, the influence of the Zionist regime has led the pressured Director-General to provide an extensive and detailed report."
From an Intelligence perspective, given that Iran is attacked by an official and a semi-official member of the Agency, and the Agency remains silent, Iran cannot trust it with providing information and access. Naturally, after the 12-day war, the status of nuclear sites is not merely a nuclear issue but is governed by specific security considerations. Furthermore, in Iran's view, the Director-General... acts more as the intelligence arm of the US, Israel, and other European countries than his predecessors. Under such conditions, reaching a technical and diplomatic consensus between Iran and the IAEA will be complex, difficult, and very time-consuming.
According to some experts, if the country continues to insist on the limited implementation of the safeguards agreement in response to the recent nuclear attacks, it would be better to establish a specific timeline for the continuation or change of this status. After the military attacks by Israel and the US targeting nuclear sites, Iran decided to implement the CSA in a limited manner and suspend its cooperation with the Agency in response. However, it is clear that access and safeguards cooperation cannot be kept suspended indefinitely or for a period exceeding nine months without proposing an alternative solution. In any case, the possibility of "verification" for the Agency must be maintained, even on a case-by-case and limited basis, in accordance with the NPT and Safeguards. Otherwise, this period of suspended cooperation and cessation of verification could become another Achilles' heel for the country at the IAEA Board of Governors.
The successful experience of the Modality for Resolving the Six Nuclear Issues in 2007 [1386 SH] and the Resolution of the Alleged Studies File in 2015 [1394 SH] can be considered in this regard.
To rebuild mutual trust and prevent renewed case-building:
Issuing permission for a "visit," not an "inspection," to less sensitive enrichment sites could be an immediate and confidence-building solution to navigate the tense layer of interaction with the Agency; similar to, or more limited than, the late IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano's "visit" to the Parchin site. This step must be taken simultaneously with or after the Agency's commitment to adopt an independent and decisive stance regarding the security of members' nuclear facilities.
Some experts believe the "policy of suspending cooperation with the Agency" can ultimately be sustained for 6 to 9 months. Continuing this policy beyond this timeframe could turn into a weapon against the country, potentially leading the Agency to accuse Iran of safeguards non-cooperation. If no noticeable change is observed in the Agency's positions and actions and Iran's cooperation, the US and European countries will certainly use their technical and legal arm, the Board of Governors, in the near future, perhaps at the next quarterly session, to put further pressure on Iran.
End Article